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YoungEC'17
34 Videos
YoungEC 2017 Workshop
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Thodoris Lykouris: Learning in Games: Robustness of Fast Convergence
Nick Arnosti: Centralized Clearinghouse Design: A Quantity-Quality Tradeoff
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao: Recent Progress on Simple Multi-item Auctions
Alice Gao: Peer Grading: From Theory to Practice
Okke Schrijvers: Online prediction with selfish experts
Assaf Romm: The law of one price for heterogeneous good
Irene Lo: A Simple Model for the Top Trading Cycles School Choice Mechanism Using...
Sergiu Hart: Calibration, Smooth Calibration, and Game Dynamics
Jan Christoph Schlegel: Testing Choice Theories
Ariel Rubinstein: Directions in Modeling Bounded Rationality
Noam Nisan: Complexity of Pricing
Gali Noti: An Experimental Evaluation of Regret-Based Econometrics
Zihe Wang: Geometric Approaches to Auction Design
Kira Goldner: The FedEx Problem
Christos Tzamos: Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
Alon Eden: The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result...
Manish Raghavan: Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias
Moshe Tennenholtz: AI with GT Flavor
Yannai Gonczarowski: Efficient Empirical Revenue Maximization in Single-Parameter Auction...
Shoshana Vasserman: Spilling Secrets to Competitors: The Value of Information Revelation...
Tomer Ezra: Pricing Social Goods
Bo Waggoner: On Information Elicitation and Mechanism Design
Annie Liang: Predicting Initial Play Using Crowd Predictions
James Wright: Algorithmic Modeling of Human Behavior
Ido Erev: From Anomalies to Forecasts: Toward a Descriptive Model of Human Choice Behavior
Tim Roughgarden : Complexity Theory and Algorithmic Game Theory: Some New Connections
Michal Feldman: Posted price mechanisms
Aviad Rubinstein: Beyond-X: Toward more general Prophet Inequalities and Secretary Problems
Simina Branzei: Nash social welfare for strategic agents
Rachel Cummings: The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models
Ophir Friedler: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Jieming Mao: Simultaneous Communication Complexity of Two-party Combinatorial Auctions
Inbal Talgam Cohen: Oblivious rounding, the integrality gap, and applications...
Haifeng Xu: Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
